CARLYLE AND THE IDEA
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PART I: INFINITE ASSERTORICS

While still an obscure but brilliant essayist studious of the soulful idealism within Germany's manifold post-Reformation literatures, the great 19th-century Scottish prose artist Thomas Carlyle (1795-1881) clearly identified, seized upon, and later explicitly expounded various basic and complete forms of the Idea, the concealed foundation of all appearances that comprises the fundamental reality of the world. "Our being is made up of Light and Darkness" ("Characteristics" 208), said he, quite in accord with the totalizing schema shown herein. Carlyle took the name "Idea" without hesitation directly from idealism and idealists.

Intuition of the Idea reliably guided Carlyle's deep and world-famous perspicacity as an essayist, biographer, and historian. This arguably became the sole basis of his religious understanding, thus demonstrating in a modern light—however unconsciously—the most effectual Idea of Man in finite-infinite relation. Yet his final stance, widely misunderstood still today, was not *below* the Consummate Religion but *above* it. Evidently, Carlyle occupied this position comfortably and did not fear divine retribution (see Part IV).

In 1830, Carlyle recognized an overarching, invisible structure within historical understanding that is clearly identical with the totality of the Idea—an unprecedented and little-noticed achievement in intellectual life. Upon full flowering in perpetuity, he speculated,

exploration of this pathway within the historian's art would completely renovate Mankind's self-comprehension.

At the conclusion of our essay, we discuss whether the Idea in all its living fecundity literally *possessed* this influential writer, used him as its instrument, and willy-nilly *spoke through him*—just as theorized by the Idea's greatest German exponent—something the unprepossessing Sage of Chelsea almost certainly would have denied even in the face of its possibility, which he was silently aware of. For him, it would seem, this issue was unimportant compared to *the problem of action within duty* faced by all protagonists, whose position within the Idea is a given.

As we will see, according to theory, the Idea did not dictate the artist's words but, rather, affected his very being, defining with edgy clarity what he would love and hate and *thereby* entering into language. A dense discussion through multifarious matters must be negotiated before the reader will be enabled to judge for himself concerning the fundamental activity of the Idea and whether and how it might account for what we came impressively to know of the great Carlyle's presence in the world.

Surprisingly, it was not until 1922, almost a century after the 1831 composition of Carlyle's *Sartor Resartus*, that a German scholar (Leopold, *Wurzel* 56) finally tracked down the likely origin of its seminal motif and most basic form of the Idea—the "Everlasting No" and the "Everlasting Yea"—as having been suggested to Carlyle in his reading, about 1827, of certain literary reference books (dated 1822-24) by the loquacious idealist and novelist Franz Horn (d. 1837).

Horn's books were "reviewed" at length by Carlyle in his "State of German Literature" (34-104) though, at that time, as Leopold remarks, he mentions the Yes-No formulae only in a contemporaneous notebook entry. One of the few pertinent sentences in Horn found by Leopold reads (followed by our translation): *Nur wer das ewige Ja in der Brust hat, begreift und uebersieht den verneinenden Geist* ("Only he who has the Eternal Yes in his heart can grasp and dismiss the Denying Spirit").

In a second analysis (Leopold, "Carlyle" 215), another sentence from Horn is pointed out: *Die Vater der Lüge ist ganz besonders schwer zu zeichnen, und wer kein ewiges Ja in der Brust hat, der vermeide sorgsam die Darstellung des ewigen Nein* ("The Father of Lies is

especially difficult to delineate, and he who has not the Eternal Yes in his heart quite misses the depiction of the Eternal No").

Leopold (*Wurzel* 56) thinks Carlyle was simply summarizing his readings of Horn when he wrote in his notebook (January 1827): "It was God that said Yes. It is the Devil that for ever says No" (Froude 373). These polarities in *Sartor Resartus* are typically assessed by readers and scholars as purely psychological; their actual 17th-century cosmic source and meaning, sounding the farthest depth of Reality, have lain unsuspected (in relation to Carlyle) for nigh on two centuries. In Part IV we show how Carlyle's early apprehension of the Idea in Horn expanded and took further root in his 1830 study "On History."

Leopold ("Carlyle" 218) neglects to investigate how and where Horn himself (ca. 1822-24) picked up the "Yes-No" formulation, and in fact implies that specifications of it are "coinages" of Horn's that Carlyle simply found "of importance for the formulation of his philosophy of life."

In context, this is a questionable statement from a German scholar. Leopold, who is of course discussing German philosophical literature, neglects an obvious possibility—that Carlyle, in the years of intensive preparative study preceding the composition of *Sartor Resartus* (1831), could have pursued the root of the Yes-No motif (which is quite famous in German idealism) beyond Horn into the works of Jacob Boehme, specifically the text "177 Theosophic Questions" (*Electione*, 273-327).

However, our study has browsed major books on *Sartor Resartus* and its sources, extending well into the 21st century. Scholars in German and in English over a period of two centuries uniformly failed to detect that the "Yes-No" motif (a basic form of the Idea) actually originates in Jacob Boehme. We turn next to that source (plus another major text from the same author) and its suitably transformed (though unacknowledged) appearance in *Sartor Resartu*s.

Readers are first advised that the elaborate teachings (ca. 4,000 pages) of the great idealist Jacob Boehme (d. 1624), for our purposes, concern both the visible and the invisible Reality underlying the totality of the world, which is summarized in an oddly memorable diagram (abstracted in the Schema of the Idea below). The Silesian philosopher himself drew the original of this diagram (labeled "Philosophische

Kugel") as part of an incisive book from 1620 on the psyche in context (*Forty Questions of the Soul*), which includes details not considered here, viz., *sixty-five named loci in finite-infinite relation within what could be denominated the Divine World Order*, each discussed in the associated text (Boehme, *Questions* 44-76).

Online search using the title given here will return authentic reproductions of the seminal diagram in German; good English versions (which perhaps could be labeled by readers here as "Intelligible Sphere") are harder to find, but one is reproduced accurately in vol. 2 of the scarce but well-known 4-vol. "William Law" edition (1764) of the Silesian Master's oeuvre, which is in large university and major metropolitan libraries.

Our discussion below (Part IV) of Carlyle's text "On History" actually has in mind the elaborate structure discussed in *Forty Questions* plus the diagram. (We have found no indication that Carlyle read this book; one of his letters [April 1830] does speak of the "William Law" edition.) The deep structure of historiography would certainly reflect the Divine World Order as involving a vast, immaterial cosmic reality frankly constituting the "Now."

Our Schema of the Idea is an abstract of that immaterial paradigm, which actually involves the entirety of finite-infinite determinations. Note that the schema can be turned in any orientation—it is only the interior relations of the Idea, which are self-instantiated by an Infinite Mind, that are fixed and unchangeable. **Determinations (*Bestimmungen)* in bold-face constitute the "No."**

The best non-religious penetration of the Silesian philosopher's work (Grunsky) is valuable but is itself completely naive as to the physical foundation, since this directly involves much later field theory (1973-1986). The latter describes the continuously active subatomic system amazingly apprehended, evidently through introspection, by the Meister of Goerlitz in his concrete description of Reality, although of course he did not use modern terms for the constituents of the system.

One of Grunsky's tipped-in diagrams can be taken as the field-theoretic heart of the protonic system ("Qualitaeten-Schema"). In modern terms this can be understood as the infinitely complex, inaccessible but hugely active, intra-protonic system of

"chromodynamical light," as understood within modern microphysics. Its "disguised" powers (discussed below) are infinite. The protons in toto may be taken as windows into the oneness of Eternal Nature and the putative Divine Reality standing behind it.

Unfortunately, to our knowledge, there is as yet no published, non-mathematical, pertinent text to which interested readers can be referred. Watson (ch. 9) has an approachable, relatively non-technical discussion, which can be loosely correlated with Grunsky's "Qualitaeten-Schema." We must point out that the simplicity of the name "proton" disguises a daunting immaterial and mathematically infinite complexity, quite beyond adequate summation in an essay.

The mentioned diagram and Grunsky's elaborative text, because they describe the fundament of cosmic and extra-cosmic Reality—which was directly perceived (according to the philosopher's accounts) and verbally described by the Silesian Master—remain today of unique importance in world literature and should be carefully noted by scholars. Grunsky spent a large fraction of his life composing the text and preparing five high-value elaborative diagrams.

Grunsky's "Qualitaeten-Schema" is actually to be understood in modern terms as an immaterial system of quantizable fields rotationally moving at nearly the speed of light. It composes the Reality of Realities, the Ultimate Fundament, which is physically determinative of everything derivative and everything alive—including the "Eternal No" and the "Eternal Yes," discussed by Jacob Boehme in 1624 and restated by Carlyle in 1831, either from first- or second-hand acquaintance, in *Sartor Resartus*. In Part III, we discuss the Fichtean perception of the system and its inexorable involvement in the Life of Man.

With these preliminaries, we turn to "177 Theosophic Questions" (Boehme, *Electione*), which with some risk of oversimplification can be understood as a discussion of a vast, polarized, "eternal" (in the "Now"), invisible conflict between Good and Evil. This struggle is actually founded in the subatomic, but has been projected into, and therefore energizes, all finite worldly reality. As we will see, the "Yes" is *actually unopposed*, and can never be truly opposed; the heresy of Manichaeism is therefore excluded. (This point becomes important in the discussion below.)

The worldly contrariety will continue with woeful pathos until the Created World is brought to a conclusive end, an event described in premonitory detail in the philosopher's great lost work (*The Last Judgement*), which reportedly was burnt in manuscript along with an entire city in Silesia ("Greater Glogau") during horrific religious war in Europe. The author states explicitly in his preface (*Electione* 273) that the things treated of in "177 Theosophic Questions," which is unfinished and was the last manuscript handled by the philosopher before his death, are sufficiently expounded at greater length elsewhere in his voluminous writings. He then says:

"The reader is to know that in Yes and No consist all things, be they divine, diabolic, terrestrial, or however they may be named" (279). The One, as the Yes, is "pure power and life," while the No "is a counterstroke [*Gegenwurf*] of the Yes or the truth [*Wahrheit*], in order that the truth may be manifest and a Something [*Etwas*] in which there may be a *contrarium*, in which the Eternal Love may be moving, feeling, willing, and such as can be loved." The No in fact represents "an inequality . . . a "shutting in" (*einschliessend*) to negativity (281), while the Yes is an eternal efflux (*Ausgang*) *actually unopposed* by the No ("for it has no No before it"). The No as an "emanated desiring will" is merely *intrahent* (*einziehend*) and delusively "comprehends itself in itself" (282).

All becomes a little clearer after pages more in this vein, when the philosopher declares: "The Yes is divine, and the No is the selfness of nature . . . ." (298). As will be suggested below, this comes very close to the exact comprehension of Carlyle, which he applies in manifold ways when discussing human life within Natural Being and in all of Society (e.g., in "Characteristics").

As we read the last words of Teutonicus Philosophicus before his untimely death, we hear him give a brief synopsis of his teaching: "The whole creation," he says (in words best understood with reference to the Schema of the Idea below), "the whole creation of the inner and outer world, in the holy Pure Element [the infinite] and in the Four Elements [the finite], is a mere fashioning and shaping of Divine Powers . . . as in Yes and No" (299).

The web page of the International Jacob Boehme Society (IJBG) (Internationalen Jacob Böhme-Gesellschaft) in Goerlitz, maintained by Thomas Isermann in Berlin, specifically, though with relative brevity, discusses "177 Theosophic Questions" in German. Isermann remarks rather casually of the Silesian Master's dicta—the Infinite Assertorics of "Yes" and "No" under consideration here—that their "implications are hard to gauge [!]. Without the No, there would be no Yes. Both belong together like black and white, left and right, up and down, good and evil . . . war and peace, darkness and light (Boehm's two transcendent 'principles'), sentence and opposition, yin and yang" (Isermann).

The foregoing line of presentation, according to what we already know of the text, is recklessly inaccurate (for the Yes "has no No before it" [*es hat kein Nein vor ihm*]). This appears to be a sly attempt—which we have found oft-repeated in modern Germany—to brand the Meister of Goerlitz as a heretic. Here, then, the sublime blood of the Silesian spirit is purposely made to run off into Brandenburg sand. The "No" speaks! (Jacob Boehme remains controversial, especially in Germany.)

With these precursors, it is now pertinent to ask: How does Carlyle represent this form of the Idea in *Sartor Resartus*? In fact, he summarizes the entirety of the foregoing in a few well-chosen words (*Sartor* 128-129): "Fly, then, false shadows of Hope . . . ; ye too, haggard spectres of Fear . . . ; ye too are all shadows and a lie." A "new Heaven and a new Earth," judges Carlyle, is attainable by a simple Moral Act, namely, Annihilation of Self (*Selbst-toedtung*). Thus, in the sudden, effortless appearance of True Freedom to the protagonist of the story, "my mind's eyes were now unsealed, and its hands ungyved."

We will question the "simplicity" of any such Moral Act later in our essay (Part III), because (according to the Silesian Master) it is far more difficult for the finite, embodied psyche than Carlyle allowed for, since the embodied will is energized by fundamentally embroiled powers of Darkness and Light (see A.J. Penny's explanation in Part III).

In actuality, what is being referred to by the decision for "Yes" or "No" is the psyche's immaterial motion—from the materio-sensual illusivity of Stage Left to the immaterial inward clarity of Stage Right (with reference to the Schema of the Idea). It may be helpful for readers to keep in mind that this checkered path is analogous to the *Odyssey* of

Homer. Another literary key is Augustine's *City of God*, which describes the intertwined mixture of Good and Evil (the "Yes" and "No") in prosaic existence, i.e., with reference to the Schema of the Idea, the baleful road along Stage Left in spacetime.

In fact, the possibility for each psyche's reception of appropriate Infinite Direction (the Reflected Yes) is merely a form of the irresistible overpowering of Dead Matter by Eternal Life, which is constantly communicated to all living things by the Soul of the World (the direct "Yes-No" in unconscious but living self-relation) acting at the microphysical fundament of Living Beings.

Carlyle's Scottish countryman Andrew Baxter beautifully covered large aspects of the field (except for the microphysics) in his two-volume tour de force, *An Enquiry into the Nature of the Human Soul*, but we have not found evidence that Carlyle ever saw it or even heard of Baxter. This would appear to be a fateful educational lacuna.

Note carefully that the psyche *need apply no effort of will*. On the contrary, it must s*uspend its finite will*, *completely kill it* (for it is the "No"), and thus *cease blocking of the always appropriate direction and guidance* of the Divine Power, which is constantly being offered to it by its Creator— through the Reflected Yes—who knows best the purposes for which the psyche was created and in fact has pre-attuned it through design for Divine Action in its specific worldly existence. The Creator is, after all, an Infinite Mind.

Taking up this theatrical Infinite Conflict and its resolution within Reality, mentioned above, Carlyle appropriately recognizes the Divine Affirmation (the "Yes"), "that ever speaks through" Nature despite itself (*Sartor* 130). When Man is unhappy it is "because there is an Infinite [the "Yes"] in him, which with all his cunning he cannot quite bury [through the "No"] under the Finite" (131). Things go best for Worldly Man when he casts aside his materio-sensual proclivities, explains Carlyle.

"It is only with Renunciation [*Entsagen*]," Carlyle adds, "that Life [in God], properly speaking, can be said to begin" (132). The afflictions of life (the "No" in its endlessly destructive particularity) may be considered a Didactic Necessity (133). "The Self in thee [the "No" in essence]"—concludes the Sage of Chelsea—"needed to be annihilated"

in order to triumph over Eternal Death. Thus does Carlyle correctly understand the profound gravitas of the divine *Gegenwurf* set forth by the great philosopher we have been considering, who goes unnamed in *Sartor Resartus*. And the purpose of the World is indeed didactic (see Part IV).

II. THE TREE OF EXISTENCE

We turn next to Carlyle's insightful recognition of the Idea as intuited in Norse folklore long centuries before the momentous achievements of German idealism that we have been discussing. This intuition of the Idea is enthusiastically elaborated at length by Carlyle in his London lecture of 1840 on Odin as prototypical Hero (*Heroes* 35-46) and is mentioned in *Past and Present* (47) as well. Carlyle saw deep meaning in *Igdrasil*, the Norse people's fabled and soulful Tree of Existence, with its living branches reaching into the nordic Heaven (as Eternal Life) and its roots reaching into the nordic Hell (as Eternal Death).

Readers should note the direct mapping of *Igdrasil* to the vertical axis of the Schema of the Idea. Undoubtedly, Carlyle did not consciously recognize the correspondence of this to his earlier mastery of the "Everlasting No" and "Everlasting Yea" in *Sartor Resartus*, but it is clear that his intellectual response was comparable. Note that, schematically, *the Tree of Existence in* Heroes *is basically the intuitively horizontal Yes-No relation of* Sartor *rotated by ninety degrees*. We believe our study is the first to take note of this.

Readers can find a modern summary of Carlyle's representation of *Igdrasil* in Nixon, who points to the "Sacred Tree" mentioned in *Sartor Resartus* and further explains that the "body" of *Igdrasil* represents "Midgard," which we can understand metaphysically as the Finite World projected into Stage Left on the horizontal axis of the Schema of the Idea (elaborations on this below).

Interestingly, the "uroboros"—the serpent circling Midgard protectively and typically depicted as devouring its own tail—can be related to the concept of "the End finding itself in the Beginning," a descriptive finality predicting the End Times and each Soul's last

moments that repeatedly punctuates the writings of Teutonicus Philosophicus.

It should be noted that the Norse concept of *Igdrasil* is not properly to be understood as a psychological "symbol" but rather as a conceptual Image of Fundamental Reality, just as we have been considering in all our explorations of Carlyle and the Idea.

We thus bring to the reader's attention the high ontological significance of the many-sided Norse image of *Igdrasil.* Concrete and penetrating are the four "wild stags" (of one *genus*, i.e., one Fundamental Idea) said to run through the limbs of the gigantic Sacred Ash. These entities are notably *alive*, like the three Fundamental Forces (Strong, Weak, and Electromagnetic), which are energized, according to our reasonable interpretation of the Meister of Goerlitz, by the most fundamental powers of the Triune God and directly manifested in Eternal Nature, the subatomic foundation of Natural Being.

The "stags" cavorting in the Sacred Ash all have proper names beginning with the letter "D," or its roman-letter Norse *sound* in the folklore (though the names are not recognized for discussion by Carlyle). It can be speculated that the four "Ds" arose in the pagan Norse intuition of the Latin *dextral*, which is the 93%-dominant (protonic) half of the positive-negative bifurcation within the existing mass-energy determination of electromagnetism (as discussed above and below). See also the Schema of the Idea.

The physical meaning of *Igdrasil* may be further understood by recalling that German idealism, ca. 1801 (in Hegel's *Habilitationsschrift,* a well-known writing), comprehended the Four as denoting Nature, while the Three, of course, reflects the Triune God behind Eternal Nature which, as mentioned, is the hidden foundation of Natural Being as we know it.

From hence it is a reasonable surmise (which we are pursuing elsewhere) that one of the three sides within Eternal Nature (the Idea of Electromagnetism) *instantaneously bifurcated* like a light switch by Divine Will at the Creation (pace Augustine), creating the Four, and emanating everything via the electron, fully developed and functioning, which had been developed immaterially but concretely within Eternal Nature; Creation was precisely this and nothing else at root—all this line

of physical comprehension is implicit in the deep lore of the Norse Sacred Ash.

Thus, *Igdrasil*, as the Tree of Existence, includes precocious Norse intuitions of the four fundamental divisions of the exploded Idea of Electromagnetism (positive, negative, and their associated magnetic polarities), since Midgard is structured, and even deformed (see below), by their capricious and imperious activity.

The final effect of the electromagnetic deployment of the World, simply put, is to produce an infinite "electric tension" ubiquitous in the World as given to Man (understood as physically derived through Eternal Nature from the protonic Absolute Light and the Absolute Dark) with a "sinister" twist—originating through reflection from the Primal Left—as a secondary derivation, called the "spiritus mundi" (pace Jacob Boehme), embodying the whole of spacetime with its contents and continuously affecting all sensuous things and beings. This is the highly concrete Reflected No (see Schema of the Idea).

Beckoning those wandering the projected doleful wastes within the Primal Left is a Constant Attractant, the invisible inward or Primal Right (the "Reflected Yes"), the world of Eternal Life, which immanently draws the guileless, unresisting psyche, if it freely permit, toward personal embodiment of seemingly spontaneous Divine Action (as described above and below). This is accessible to the psyche by a generalized introspective power, usefully examined by the Silesian Master in his "Of Baptism" (153-190). Primal Right and Stage Right are equivalent; there is a Stage Right because the "Philosophisches Kugel" is literally the two-fold Divine Eye (i.e., the Idea) looking outward from itself! Look at your neighbor's face—his (stage) right is on your left.

For a detailed, modern synopsis of the sinister dominance of Primal Left in relation to the cosmos and the neurophysical structure of Man as embodied, involving a characteristic (and heretofore unrecognized), ontologically pathological distortion of the Human Face itself, readers may consult the present author's published exposition on the matter (7-11). The Human Face is seen as very deep, representing a three-fold special re-creation unlike anything else in nature. (Intense interest in the concrete human face of the protagonists he was concerned with is a consistent thread seen in Carlyle's *modus operandi*.)

Examination of Carlyle's writings reveals that he was aware of the important distinction between the Divine Yes and No (the vertical axis in the Schema of the Idea), leading to Life and Death in infinity—which to Carlyle and to his hero Martin Luther symbolized the wrathful, impossibly demanding Mosaic Law—and the Reflected Yes and No (the horizontal axis of the Schema of the Idea), known generically by Mankind as the Vale of Tears.

Carlyle correctly comprehended the Vale of Tears as an axis of moral decision in the finite, linear life of the Primal Left—the time-dominant Field of the Reprehensible—escape from which is possible only by means of the Primal Right, which naturally proffers (1) Divine Assistance and Forgiveness from a certain unmentioned "greatest of all Heroes" (*Heroes*, 28) and (2) salvific escape for the psyche, at the end of life, through the effortless inward path, previously described. Both proceed in essentiality (i.e., in the Field of the Reprehensible) by and through the moment of self-abnegation represented by the "Everlasting Yea" (here the Reflected Yes). A suitable formulation of life-decision on the horizontal path is found in *Latter-Day Pamphlets* (266).

Readers could perhaps keep in mind that the inelastic vertical axis of infinite conflict (Divine Wrath) is analogous to the pathos of Homer's *Iliad*—a rigid struggle between an inflexible "Yes" (affirmation of Intelligible Beauty) and a recalcitrant "No" (assertion of Sensuous Beauty). Homer brings the Yes and No to an infinite tension in the *Iliad*, in contrast to the moral gradations and agonies perforce weighed by Odysseus and his men in Homer's companion poem.

Our Schema of the Idea could be adjusted to reflect a literary orientation in view of Homer's importance in the *Iliad* as a Seer of Divine Wrath comparable to Moses—but then "wing over," as it were, into the unreconstructed moral wasteland and betrayals that frame the struggles of Odysseus. Carlyle offers an incisive formulation ("Characteristics" 194) doing precisely this in a newer religious context:

"The Duties of Man to himself, to what is highest in himself, make but the First Table of the Law; to the First Table is now superadded a Second, with the Duties of Man to his Neighbor; whereby also the significance of the First now assumes its true importance." Here the

vertical and horizontal axes of the Schema of the Idea are brought into exact Christian correspondence.

Finally, the necessary reconstruction of the psyche's loves and hates through "the greatest of all Heroes" and His Cross, constantly seen by Carlyle (as discussed in Part IV)—but of course unseen and unimagined by Homer and all the pre-Christian Greeks—has been described above. As discussed in Part IV, a mechanism for the clarification of the entirety of the moral didactics and distinctions prior to prosaic existence is a theme taken up by Carlyle in his profound investigation "On History."

VIRTUAL (7% MASS-ENERGY)
ETERNAL NOW
LIGHT ("YES")
LIFE
INFINITE

INVISIBLE INWARD WORLD	C	**VISIBLE WORLD OF SPACETIME**
INWARD REFLECTS LIFE	R	**EXTERNAL REFLECTS DEATH**
STAGE RIGHT (SPIRIT)	+	**STAGE LEFT (SENSUAL)**
PRIMAL RIGHT	O	**PRIMAL LEFT**
INFINITE PURE ELEMENT	S	**FINITE FOUR ELEMENTS**
REFLECTS "YES"	S	**REFLECTS "NO"**

INFINITE
DEATH
DARK ("NO")
ETERNAL NOW
REAL (93% MASS-ENERGY)

Schema of the Idea (pace Boehme, *Questions* 44-45)

III. THE FICHTEAN PARADIGM

We now approach the heart of our essay. In *Heroes, Hero Worship, and the Heroic in History* (1840), Carlyle explicitly discusses the many-faceted Idea (a word of Classical Greek origin), endorses its general nature, and seems clearly to credit Johann Fichte (d. 1814) as its chief proponent. Carlyle's impression was both correct and incorrect. It is arguable that the pertinent book by Fichte, first discussed at some length by Carlyle in his "State of German Literature" (1827), did not thematically originate its approach to the Idea—which at any rate is a

venerable subject in idealism. Teutonicus Philosophicus with his pregnant concept of Eternal Nature (see discussion below) is an obvious root.

It is beyond the scope of this essay to speculate on the didactico-political reasons for Fichte's editorial decisions. Our meagre acquaintance with German sources on this specific point indicates that the Germans are also in the dark, and certainly Hegel never observes it. As portrayed in William Smith's biography (Fichte, *Nature* 1-115), Fichte was undauntedly obstreperous and did act impetuously, characteristics that eventually entailed his academic ruin.

However, in defense of our conclusion that the notion of the Idea in Fichte is a creative appropriation from the Meister of Goerlitz—a point that will become supportive further down when readers will have a chance to see and more minutely examine Fichte's views—we ask readers to note the Silesian Master's stark statement (emphasis added) from *Electione*, namely, that the Eternal Unity, viz., the Good, "does itself emanate from itself, and with the emanation brings itself into will and movement . . . . He is in, with, and through us; *and where in a life he becomes mobile with his love, there God [the Good] in his working is revealed.* That is, his love or the Unity is there emanating, perceptible and endowed with a will" (275). The Meister of Goerlitz himself evidently came to personally embody the Idea. According to consistent observations in various biographies and detailed, clear statements by the philosopher in many of his epistles, it softly but relentlessly spoke through him *par excellence*.

Concerning the essential (non-symbolic) nature of the Idea, Carlyle asserts its ontological priority above all things (*Heroes*, 78). The Idea "lies everywhere in all Beings" and "veritably *is*" [our emphasis], manifesting itself "in all times and in all places." He even adopts Hegel's phraseology (from the *Wissenschaft der Logik*, 1811-1816, rev. 1831), that the Idea is the "realized Thought of God" (78). The Idea, he adds sardonically, is an "open secret . . . seen by almost none!" Thus, "it is a pity for every one of us if we do not know it, live ever in the knowledge of it. Really a most mournful pity; a failure to live at all, if we live otherwise!"

Still, Carlyle's relatively sound study of mathematics and science led him only so far into the comprehension of the Idea's true depth. Having little understanding of the trend in science even then toward dematerialization of "matter" (Hegel's extended remarks [ca. 1827] in his *Philosophie der Natur,* translated twice in the 1970s, could be educed), Carlyle despaired of a solution which had for centuries already been achieved pace Plato and in the depths of German idealism: "Matter," he said in 1840, "is a thing no man will ever, in time or out of time, comprehend; after thousands of years of ever-new expansion, man will find himself but struggling to comprehend again a part of it; the thing is larger than man, not to be comprehended by him; an Infinite thing!" (*Heroes* 42).

Indeed, as we have been discussing in the present essay, Eternal Nature (i.e., the Idea), the protonic interior from which "matter" is projected as excited electron fields from mathematically infinite depths (for this is the central comprehension of modern field theory beginning with Dirac), is perforce prosaic despite being "infinite" (for it *disguises it own infinity* according to Dirac) and yet is, in the end, as in the present essay, capable of conceptualization, as projecting a distorted manifestation of itself (Nature per se) into spacetime. Carlyle's despair on this point thus can be seen as misguided, though understandably so. Who could have foreseen field theory?

Hence, the Idea remained for Carlyle, who was ever on the alert for *demonstrable facts*, essentially a "mystery" (*Heroes* 79), only really understandable by "Prophets and Poets," whom he recognizes nevertheless as men "sent hither to make it known to us." But Carlyle understood this only abstractly: The Teacher is *sent* pure and simple (he is *born*); then he *discovers* and promulgates a "message" mysteriously (and *unfathomably*, according to Carlyle) from within, "either consciously or unconsciously" (238). At best, he "participates" (79), later adding that Speech and poetic Song are the likely the "primal element" (81).

Yes, indeed! Speech, properly cogitated in its neuropsychological context (Schleyer 10), is rooted in Eternal Nature (i.e., the Idea), which "magically" (field-theoretically) connects subject and object for the psyche and harbors for its use what in the 20th century was named

"Universal Grammar." Verbal articulation (and thought) is thus simultaneously both inward and outward, this situation being very concretely expounded by the Meister of Goerlitz in its place, but still only merely suspected and hypothetically postulated even by the most brilliant linguists of Modernity—who, as materialists almost to a man, ever live in Philosophical Darkness.

Speech and introspectively derived Song, which are praised by Carlyle but relegated to "mystery," are therefore not possible at all without the Idea! But Carlyle "never really penetrated to the heart" of the German sources of his scientific (*wissenschaftliche*) insight (Harrold 19), and without them could not possibly reach the scientific essence of the matters he dealt with. If he had, we believe he would have agreed that the Idea is the Living Principle ever divinely active in the Instrument of Man, Carlyle himself being no exception. In fact, as we will see, this was Fichte's precise view, which Carlyle never explicitly acknowledged and in fact cunningly obscured (undoubtedly because he did not agree with it!). At that time (1827), quietly omitting this, he said simply: "Fichte's metaphysical theory may be called in question" ("State" 74).

We see more clearly how Carlyle evaded confrontation with his objective problem comprehending the true depth of Idea when, later in *Heroes*, he recurs to his years-earlier singling out of Fichte's chief book on the Idea (*Ueber das Wesen des Gelehrten*), and takes its message once again in what we would understand (and translate into our own lexicon) as something finite (personal, appropriative) rather than infinite (expressive, divinely iterative). "Whoever lives not wholly in this . . . Idea or, living partially in it, struggles not, as for the one good, to live wholly in it," is not being *true*, says Carlyle. He means that such men are not Infinite Teachers but, rather, merely Finite. "This is Fichte's notion of the Man of Letters," adds Carlyle. "It means in its own form, precisely what we here mean" (*Heroes* 134).

But this is not exactly what Fichte actually said or meant, as Carlyle's contemporaries would learn five years later (in 1845) with William Smith's publication in London of the first full English translation of Fichte's vigorous book. But by that time, in C.F. Harrold's estimation, which itself may be suspect (Harrold 235), the German roots

of Carlyle's "unharmonious body of thought" had receded to the background, having been replaced by more prosaic concerns. True, in Carlyle's early maturity Germanic thought patterns actually became "the country of his soul," Harrold admits (237). "And they remained, even throughout his later years, part of the sturdy foundation of all that he thought and was."

Let us quickly dismiss the idea that Carlyle at some point pushed things Germanic to the background—on the contrary, he pursued the germanically derived Idea (as we have defined it) until the end of his working life, as seen, for example, in his greatest work, *The History of Frederick the Great* (1858-1865). John Clubbe (219) supports this succinctly: "*Frederick*, like Milton's epic, pits the universal True [the "Yes"] against the everlasting False [the "No"] and utilizes prophetic zeal to vindicate that truth and lead people toward a life 'happier far.'" Carlyle's portrayal of Fichte's Man of the Idea, however, was indeed truncated and less heroically aimed than the real thing. (The loss of *heroism* was Carlyle's own!) This will become apparent to the reader.

In a fairly detailed analysis of Carlyle's published remarks (1827) on Fichte's book in relation to what it actually contains, Harrold concludes that "it is probable" Carlyle must have confined himself to the First Lecture among the ten in the book (82), though, again, Harrold himself tendentiously interprets Fichte (86) so as to make him deny what Carlyle apparently rightly believed, namely, that the Idea is the "great First Cause." (We take the word "cause" here to mean, *in essentiality*.) Like those who famously (and falsely) accused Fichte of atheism (who were largely repeating the false allegations of heresy brought against poor Jacob Boehme in his saddest days), Harrold fails to grasp that the Idea—at least for the Silesian Master—is *not God* but is merely His tool for manifestation and creation. Maladroit perception of this is the dominating view in Europe to the present day.

It is helpful, therefore, to introduce Alexander Whyte's deft assessments (72-75) for use in defense of Fichte and his Silesian predecessor. While Whyte references the phrase "Eternal Nature" rather than "Idea," this an immaterial distinction, since "the origin of all things lies in the idea [*in der Idea]*, in an eternal process of forming [*in ewiger Bildung*]" (*Electione* 316), and this is nothing else than Eternal Nature.

Thus, we exchange the terms below. Whyte's discussion can be taken as definitive; it concludes (72) that the concept represented here by the Idea "must never be taken for the Eternal God."

The Idea, says Whyte, is thus "the great storehouse and workshop in which all the created essences, elements, principles, and potentialities of all possible worlds are laid up . . . into which the Filial Word enters . . . (74)." The Idea "is an invisible essence, and it is the essential ground out of which all the visible and invisible worlds are made" (75). This can be compared to Fichte's introductory assertion (*Nature* 123): "Whatever is to be manifested in the thought and deed of man, must first be inwardly present in his nature, and indeed itself constitute his nature, being, and life."

The foregoing is in a sense a distraction from what we take to be the real issue between Fichte and Carlyle. It does not matter whether Carlyle got beyond the First Lecture (given at Erlangen in 1805), since Fichte pedagogically presages almost everything of substance in the lecture actually reviewed by Carlyle ("State" 74). Of first importance, then, to readers of the present essay, are two Fichtean passages (*Nature* 129-130) that Carlyle *omits* from his review, namely:

1. "In individual human beings the eternal Divine Idea takes up its abode, as their spiritual nature; this existence . . . in them encircles itself with unspeakable love; and then we say . . . this man loves the Idea, and lives in the Idea . . . when in truth it is *the Idea itself which, in his stead and in his person, lives and loves itself,* and in his person is only the sensible manifestation of this existence of the Idea, and has, in and for itself alone, neither significance nor life" (129) (emphasis added).

2. "In the true Scholar the Idea has acquired a personal existence which has entirely superseded his own, and absorbed it [the finite] in itself . . . . The effort of the Idea to unfold itself which is so much higher than all the pursuits of sense, is also infinitely more mighty, and with silent power breaks a way for itself through every obstacle" (130).

We invite readers, for their own edification, to compare the foregoing electrifying theses of Fichte to the activity of the Idea in Man in the setting of "heroism" expressed in modern scholarship and reported

by David Sorensen (Carlyle, *Heroes* 1-16). For we consider Heroes first of all to have been possessed of the Idea, obtaining inward powers by intuition or self-study and not from their external communities—which Heroes instruct as a result and are not instructed *by*.

In his homeland, Fichte is still today (Schönherr-Mann) informally interpreted by crypto-materialists as asserting a mere finite reflexivity in the activity of the Idea, despite his talking of it as a unity of subject and object (which it is at the microphysical Fundament) and he even naming this "the absolute self." The weight of our evidence, as explored in this Part III—considering the texts themselves—is to the contrary.

We do not see how Fichte's Idea (*Nature* 123-132) can be interpreted as a denial of Providence, though Fichte's earlier writings were taken then as doing this, and by some still are. No one guesses that Fichte mined Jacob Boehme for anything, despite their clear verbal affinity, as demonstrated in this Part III, in identically characterizing the Idea's power in Man as embroilment of divine "self-love." It is clear what the Meister of Goerlitz meant, at least. Perhaps Fichte's own intuition of the Idea reached farther than his dicta! This would be interesting to explore.

With Carlyle in mind, and especially his remarks reported earlier in this Part III on poetic, prophetic, and rational "reception" of the Idea, readers should compare what Fichte says of the self-constructing nature of the Idea in intuition, namely, *that possession of its rudiments is possession of the power to acquire further definition*. "The nature of the Idea is peculiar to itself, and differs wholly from all that is mechanical in knowledge; only by its reception can man cultivate the power of receiving it" (*Nature* 207).

Readers are also invited to consider with care the trenchant summations by Fichte of the final status of the Idea in the Man of Letters (emphases added except where indicated), once he has acquired the Idea as an inner power, keeping the manly career of Thomas Carlyle ever in mind:

1. The Idea "clothes itself to him in words . . . and penetrating to the inner spirit of his language, *frames from thence a vesture for itself* [!], by its own inherent power (217).

2. "The Idea does not rule the language directly, but *only through him [the author] as possessor of the language* . . . . As the Idea becomes more vivid, language spontaneously appears" (218).

3. The work of the Man of Letters possessed of the Idea "is in itself a work for eternity . . . has not recorded *his* [Fichte's emphasis] knowledge alone, but also the fixed and settled character of a certain age in relation to that knowledge . . . . Independent of all vicissitude . . . his pages speak in every age to all men who are able to realize his thought" (219).

Before discussing whether Fichte is right or not—i.e., whether Carlyle was possessed *of,* or *by*, the Idea—we should note that Fichte's lectures (*Nature* 134-136) assert other pregnant things that Carlyle may or may not have read (we will never know) but most of which he appears to have absorbed by osmosis, as it were, such as:

1. "there is no other being than Life" (134);
2. "the Absolute is Life and Life is the Absolute" (134);
3. Divine Life discloses itself, appears, becomes visible, manifests itself as such . . . and this its manifestation, presence, or outward existence, is the world" (134);
4. "the manifestation of life in time, unlike the Divine Life, is limited at every point of its existence, i.e., it is in part not living, not yet interpenetrated by life" (135);
5. "the objective and material world . . . arresting and hemming in the Time-Life [life in time], by this hindrance alone spreads over a longer or shorter period of time that which would otherwise burst forth at once, a perfect and complete life" (136);

Again, the philosopher (136-139) further asserts things which Carlyle seems to have felt and expressed repeatedly in his own words:

1. "Nature itself is interpenetrated by life; and is thus both the obstacle to, and the sphere of, that activity and outward expression of power in which human life eternally unfolds itself" (136);
2. "in all ages, the theoretical errors as well as the moral corruptions of humanity have arisen from falsely bestowing the name of life on that which in itself

possesses neither absolute nor even finite being, and seeking for life and its enjoyments in that which in itself is dead" (136);

3. "This flowing forth of the Divine Life is endless, and the comprehension of its parts can thus never be completed; the comprehender himself . . . stands chained in the finite" (137);
4. "Divine Life is the only true life . . . all things else besides this life [the "No"] are but hindrances and obstructions thereto, only possessing existence that by them the true life [the "Yes"] may be unfolded" (139).

As mentioned in Part I, Carlyle's summary of the "Yes" in 'Sartor Resartus' seemingly brings forth (in his protagonist) the simplicity of a prompt "Moral Act" in favor of the right, good, true, beautiful, etc. But in conformity with the distressed interaction of the Idea and its unreconstructed finite contents just indicated by Fichte, readers can usefully consult Penny (Penny 153-158) on this point (emphasis added immediately below but is in the original in the second text block), whose accurate conclusions, as is well-known in British circles, were reached after long study of the Meister of Goerlitz:

> 'Alas,' said Carlyle writing to his mother, 'why should I dwell in the element of contempt and indignation rather than in that of patience and love?' (For the mind that is prone on all occasions to kindle into wrath on the slightest provocation, often abhors the folly.) Why? Carlyle did not guess that in every element of contempt and indignation there are mighty confederates; that our own access to that element introduces us to their wrath, and this corroborates ours. As Boehme has it, *'The darkness grasps the holy power' (i.e., deific powers in human nature) 'and brings it into malignity*, and then it is as the Scripture says, with the perverse thou are perverse, and with the holy thou are holy' . . . .
>
> 'Thou'—God in man. In precisely the same manner, and with the same plausibility, does every vice—covetousness, gluttony, lust, revenge—justify itself; and every indulgence of either propensity strengthens its hold on the will and its certain velocity of increase . . . . And if malignant or sensual properties have thus become *creaturely* in the human soul, the difficulty of opposing them by any properties that have *not* is, of course, tremendously increased; and when at last the evil properties rule [translating St. Martin's French]: 'And the horror of the situation is, that this power resides in one's own will and that one's will is itself subjected to this power, which itself has

> created and engendered.'" Thus, Penny adds further down, "The nearness of the most opposite worlds *within* us is one of the most momentous facts to which we can become awakened" (158).

Full consideration of the foregoing would take the reader through a vast region of puerile 20th century "cultural" developments, especially those entertaining the idea of "unconscious" perversities arising "naturally" in the constitution of Man (for in strict meaning, carefully distinguishing the valid concept of "subconscious," there is no *human* unconscious, according to our studies)—all of it merely a disguised and we think wholly sophistical evasion of the conundrum explored by Penny in 1901 (repeated in a heftier but similar tome by Penny dated 1912), which the present writer does not hesitate to recommend in full for the edification of readers truly concerned about the questions raised, first of all by Carlyle in his book *Sartor Resartus*. (Incidentally, the expert Whyte praises Penny unreservedly.)

As a means to approach the precise manner of Carlyle's possession of the Idea, and because of its intrinsic importance to our general argument, we must first confront as historical fact something of primary concern in German idealism, namely, that the popularized ideas of Fichte—and especially the very items effectively dismissed by Carlyle (as we have been recounting)—were contemptuously trashed (no other word is better) by Hegel, the Subtle Teuton, in his Berlin maturity (1825-1831), sitting in the chair first occupied by Fichte. We are obliged to quickly deal with this; a full treatment is beyond the scope of our essay.

Without specifying what is at issue (the substantial, divine activity of the Idea in suitably prepared/psychologically receptive individuals), in his collated lectures Hegel purports to quote Fichte thus: "Everything that man does himself is null and void. All existence is living and active in itself, and there is no other life than Being, and no other Being than God; God is thus absolute Being and Life. The divine essence likewise comes forth, revealing and manifesting itself—the World" (*Lectures* 506).

Fichte does indeed say there is no other Life than Being—though the concept of Being is the deepest of all things in idealism. Hegel

spends hundreds of pages in his *Logik* (there are several good English translations), making clear his approach, to which book readers of this essay are referred as one of greatest achievements of the human mind. But Fichte also says (*Nature* 134) there is no other Being than Life, which readers here already understand as incorrect except when it refers to the Eternal Life underlying, and continuously emanating from, Eternal Nature—an extra-mundane field-theoretic existence of course not understood in Fichte's or Hegel's time but only intuited (as with Fichte) or else *observed introspectively* (by the Silesian Master). Fichte goes on to intuit this inward aspect accurately: "This . . . Life lies entirely hidden in itself" (134).

Hence, the disagreement between Fichte and Hegel can perhaps be understood as rooted in this failure to understand Life (in space-time) as both an outward manifestation and an emanation from a timeless source that is itself a mere tool of the Triune God. It seems clear that neither Fichte nor Hegel understood the distinction that is in fact made very clear by the Silesian Master who blazed the path before them. As discussed immediately below, Hegel admits confusion while trying to understand his predecessor from Goerlitz.

Our study has found no evidence (other than textual) that Fichte knew the Silesian Master's oeuvre or that German sources even discuss it in relation to Fichte. Thus, Fichte (134) asserts that, strictly speaking, the Life of the Idea manifests itself in spacetime "as it essentially and really is [*so wie es innerlich wirklich ist*]," though "it is only in part revealed and in part remains concealed." He holds that "Time-Life" is ever partial due to the interposition of general "laws of revelation" (not detailed by Fichte here), as we have learned above in the exposition of Fichte's dicta.

He says, "God reveals himself as God can reveal himself" (135). "His whole (in itself essentially inconceivable) being comes forth undivided and unreservedly in so far as it can come forth in any mere manifestation." Fichte does not explain the matter in depth but surges forth (135) to a special conclusion, namely, that "the only true finite existence" of Life is its manifestation in "the united life of mankind," which means, as Fichte reasons further in a long and beautiful discourse (135-142), that the details are only comprehended, in the historical life

of Man, by individual intuition *and by national insight* (as with the Norse *Igdrasil*), to the extent of their native and acquired abilities.

Hegel reportedly dismisses the entirety of Fichte's reasoning in ugly terms (*Lectures* 506) that will not bear repetition here, and then (as we take it) proceeds to blaspheme God, slyly denouncing all that appears in the Times of Man through Fichte's Idea, in poetic inspiration, in prophesy, in speculative discourse, in literary flights, in true heroism—past, present, and future—as mere "vehement aspirations . . . excrescences." This can be understood as Hegel's nadir, which defect we would trace to his greatly mistaken crypto-aristotelianism. Hegel wrongly sided with Aristotle on the nature of the animal psyche, essentially denying its foundation in Eternal Nature (i.e., in the Idea), and will ever pay a price for this error.

With reference to our thesis herein, we reply that, in effect, Hegel denies through neglect what we have shown to a reasonable certitude, namely, that the Silesian Master—not Fichte himself—is the source of the Fichtean Paradigm. We think Hegel refuses to take up the implied burden (since it is impossible that the Subtle Teuton was unaware of the connection that we have demonstrated here, he having read both Fichte and the Silesian Master), for the simple reason that, in the same lectures, at different places (188-216), Hegel repeatedly and frankly admits he does not understand what Jacob Boehme is saying. Failure to understand the Meister of Goerlitz is *pari passu* failure to comprehend Fichte's Idea.

In addition, in his remarks (ca. 1828), Hegel asserts what Fichte clearly denies, namely, that the activity of Fichtean Idea in Man is merely finite, that it simply magnifies puerile "enthusiasms" (*Schwaermereien*). As seen above, Fichte explicitly denies that the Idea inflates the personal in any respect—its activity is not Man's *magnification* in the slightest but is wholly and only God's determined *manifestation*. What else does Prophesy represent? Did Hegel deny the activity of prophetic truth in Man? (Not likely! Not in Berlin!) Does Holy Scripture represent *Man's* utterance? Not according to the Hebrews, the Romanists, or the Lutherans!

It is likely that readers have not the slightest notion of the deep irony of this situation. Hegel in early maturity (in Jena, aged 33-36, at about the time of Fichte's Erlangen Lectures at age 43 that we are

considering here) in effect and in substance, in utterances which he neither retracted nor publicly regretted, completely agreed with Fichte but was much less organized and clear going about it!

At the time, Hegel was laboriously exploring Aristotle's use of the term "aether," fishing for something deeper than the Four Elements (see Schema of the Idea above) which, if Hegel had then comprehended the Silesian Master—who himself used the word "aether" ("*ewigen Aethern*") in precisely the proper sense (*Six Points* 26)—he would have identified aetherial (field-theoretic) Eternal Nature as the active Idea (through which Triune Divinity speaks and operates) and could have let the pagan Aristotle alone.

Hence, the Subtle Teuton in Jena entertained a concept of the Idea that includes the concept of World Soul (Harris 240-241), the Unity of Subject and Object (awareness), and also a Universal Grammar (which he labels the Idea's "self-speaking"), all as discussed earlier in the present essay. Hence—in Jena—Hegel expounded the same elements we have mentioned (among other things) and reached conclusions consistent with our argument and in conformity with the strict teachings of the Silesian Master.

Thus, Hegel says: "The aether is not the living God; for it is only the Idea of God" (*System* 205n) (referencing the 1804-5 lectures, i.e., N.K.A. VII, 188). The Meister of Goerlitz (text from 1620) goes further and better, stating that, through the subatomic aetherial reality of the Idea, the world as its "revelation" is essentially a Stage for Divine Action, "*whereby the Eternal, which is manifest in itself, manifests itself also out of itself, and pours out its imagination* [*"*seine Imagination ausschütte*"*]; *and thus renews [at will] that which was seized or made [by the finite Will-spirit]"* (*Six Points* 27-28). Naturally, our editing is an interpretation. In *Sartor Resartus* (ch. 8), Carlyle nicely brings the matter to a head: "WE are—we know not what—light sparkles floating in the aether of Deity!"

IV. AN EFFECTUAL IDEA OF MAN

Possessed increasingly of the concrete Idea from intuition, study, and reflection (as in his 1827 Notebook entries), about 1830, Carlyle

recognized an overarching, invisible structure within the highest possibilities of historical understanding that seems clearly identical with the totality of the Idea. This is seen in his magnificent essay "On History" (83-95). Rejecting "the outward mechanism, the mere hulls and superficial accidents" of Church History, and productive of a thought that arched later (1837) to an apogee within N.F.S. Grundtvig's soulful and widely known hymnody:

Surely in temples made with hands/
God, the Most High, is not dwelling/ . . .
We are God's house of living stones/
Builded for His habitation.

Carlyle states, "The History of the Church is a History of the Invisible as well as of the Visible Church, which latter, if disjoined from the former, is but a vacant edifice" (93).

The Philosophical Idea, Carlyle explains, is really a province of Church History. "For Philosophy, in its true sense, is or should be the soul, of which Religion, Worship, is the body; in the healthy state of things the Philosopher and the Priest were one and the same" (94). The reader should now be able to name the apotheosis of the Philosopher-Priest: Jacob Boehme (1575-1624). "Secular saint" is another possibility.

At such level, Carlyle suggests, investigation of the orders of relations within the Idea (a new kind of historiography) permissibly usurps everything heretofore of religious concern, and even things of non-economic social being, below it. Rightly prosecuted, it is more important to understand "how man's moral well-being had been and might be promoted, than to understand in the like sort his physical well-being."

Such a Church History," adds Carlyle, "would have momentous secrets to teach us: nay, in its highest degree, it were a sort of continued Holy Writ" (92). We assert that the "Philosophische Kugel" (referenced in Part I) is precisely this newly emerged (addition to) Holy Writ. As suggested in Part I, these insights of Carlyle, now freshly understood, constitute an unprecedented and little-noticed achievement in intellectual life. For, upon full flowering in perpetuity, according to Carlyle's vision

of moral-spiritual relations within the Immaterial Church, walking of this pathway within the historian's art would completely renovate Mankind's self-understanding in all things above the level of the sensual.

Many divergent opinions have been expressed on the nature of Carlyle's religious understanding, which are more easily assessed for validity now that we have explored his orientation on the Idea. Whether Carlyle was *possessed by* the Idea, which he knew and obviously embraced in many of his writings, is a question that must be left for judgment by readers of the present essay. Earlier putatively competent scholars (e.g., Tennyson 295-297) have concluded that the Yes and No are purely psychological phenomena confined to the writer and originating in his needs. Our essay asserts a conclusion both higher and deeper.

Henry Larkin (d. 1899), a convinced Believer who knew Carlyle and worked with him for years as an editorial functionary (summarized in Kaplan 415-416), characterized Carlyle's religion as wholly compatible with orthodox belief: "No one can read Carlyle's works with any real sympathy of understanding and yet doubt his absolute belief in God's universal, eternal, and ever-working Providence." Carlyle's faith was "the summary of all the Divine Silences which filled his heart" (Larkin 355) and is best understood, according to Larkin, as nothing less than the bedrock intuition upon which the Christian religion was founded—an assessment consistent with our analysis.

Thus, counting everything, Carlyle's final stance, long misunderstood, was not *below* the Consummate Religion but *above* it. If he *believed* anything, it was a strict adherence to (an ego-less) Reverential Silence! ("Characteristics" 199): "Well might the Ancients make Silence a god; for it is the element of all godhood, infinitude, or transcendental greatness; at once the source and the ocean wherein all such begins and ends."

It has been suggested that the moral abruptness of the "Everlasting Yea" in *Sartor Resartus* "implies a self-centered separateness from the rest of the world" (Campbell, "Religion" 17). We have discussed in Part III how Carlyle's seemingly facile description of Moral Decision in that book may have over-simplified a problem whose depths are explored best by the Silesian Master. (Carlyle's *personal* self-control would have

been legendary except for his addiction to tobacco! His hero Friedrich II similarly was eventually reduced to a "snuffy old man." Oh, tobacco!)

A similar-sounding accusation against Carlyle is made in the anonymous obituary published by the *St. James's Gazette* (11 Feb 1881). In effect, the writer references the divine determinations of Yes and No without comprehending that these are taken up by the psyche voluntarily *or by submission* through the Reflected Yes and the Reflected No; equates them with Calvinist "predestination;" and then inaccurately reduces Carlyle's belief simply to this heresy (Nichol 255-257). As a Straw Man created out of air, Carlyle is then perversely made to utter "survival of the fittest" in religion!

Carlisle Moore (33) would appear to be correct that the "Spiritual Optics" fragment reported in one of Froude's biographical volumes "argues for our perceiving that [for Carlyle] it is God who is at the center and not ourselves, who are moving at his divine behest, in obedience to His laws, in His divine universe." Why not? Carlyle's hero Luther, as is known, said somewhere that we are ever being ridden by God or the Devil! How is *that* for "Yes" and "No"?

Moore further perceives (33) that Carlyle "sought in his work to unite art and science" and creatively attempted to combat mechanism (which had separated "work and symbol, experience and idea, the whole and its parts"). The Sage of Chelsea, said Moore (34), heroically attempted "to unite science, poetry, and religion in a total perception"—in spirit "and in fact" following Goethe's example.

Moncure Conway (404) reports the direct words of Carlyle (late 1870s) that there is but one "real" religion, namely, the basic Idea as we have comprehended it here: *Passionate love of the good* [the "Yes"], *and abhorrence of the reverse* [the "No"].

Other heads (Campbell, "Church") show a more nuanced understanding, namely, that acceptance of the gradualism of the rightward pathway (contemplative moral rumination) in the Reflected Yes and No was specifically embraced by Carlyle: He never lost his belief in prayer, for example, and specifically in the Lord's Prayer (citing the 12 Feb 1869 letter to Erskine), which an aged Carlyle one night found himself *reading* "on the black bosom of the night," as

though having been possessed by it (as happens) in a prophetic dream state, like a vision straight from the Heart of God (148).

Or perhaps the divine prelection was voluntary, via the same Reflected Yes, which is an open path to Divine Light that Carlyle significantly described, with its inherent prescription of resignation, as "the voice of Man's soul" [!] (148). Carlyle is quoted by Allingham (28 Dec 1868) as saying, only a year earlier than the soulful vision, that his fundamental belief was the same as that evident in Lord Jesus when He faced death at the hands of his adversaries (147): "Not my will but Thine be done." This does not differ in meaning from the Lord's Prayer: "Thy will be done on Earth [i.e., in the supplicant himself] as in Heaven."

We again remind ourselves of the fundamental "Moral Act" deposed in *Sartor Resartus*: Resignation—Annihilation of Self—the psyche's first and only necessary step, as discerned at length above, to allow and permit the True Executor to work through the Reflected Yes gradually and relentlessly, with a subtlety that ever amazes!

No active process by the psyche is necessary, but simply, as we noted above: *To cease blocking the always appropriate direction and guidance* of the Divine Power, which is constantly being offered by the Triune Creator (perhaps responding to the simple supplication, "Creator of Creators, Nurturer of True Being").

In the end, of course, the protagonists—and ultimately, all Mankind—cannot avoid the decision ("Yes" or "No") which, as discussed in this essay, is a cosmic demand arising far outside themselves and from a depth that would astound them. This—not how they feel about it—should be the principal thing of concern, for their destiny depends on it. Here the Silesian Master always adds, "Amen."

As stated above, the foregoing is the voluntary psychic analog of the completely involuntary reception of free and gracious maintenance of life and physical being (Aristotle's "vegetative soul") through the "anima mundi" (the Greek "Autozoön") which, as mentioned above, is the direct, not reflected, action of Yes and No. This was well-perceived by the pagan Plato in his wonderful *Timaeus*, and yet is a concept specifically approved by the platonizing Aurelius Augustine in his writings as worthy of orthodox Christian theology *if and when proved true*. Twentieth century microphysics established the basis of the proof.

Hence, as never before, we are enabled to judge of the question, somewhat rudely brought up in the 19th century by one of Emerson's friends (Campbell, "Church" 152), complaining that Carlyle's higher ideation "has led us into the desert, and has left us there." Nothing could be further from the truth!

Summation

We can best bring our study together by pointing to the future: A longer analysis of Thomas Carlyle's unparalleled contributions to historiography, the essay, and biography would show conclusively that they are founded largely and in detail on the famous writer's belief, amounting to possession (pace Fichte), that the Idea alone (as the articulated "Yes" in reflection) is determinative of the positive values seen in actual history, great literature and art, and the world-transforming achievements of living personalities past and present. Silence as a form of resignation was correctly seen by him to quietly utter its "Yes" as well. It seems his own personality, though, was oblivious of its true role and his genius therefore maintained modesty.

The Idea's negation—selfish assertion, greed, vapid prolixity, lassitude, mendacity, and faithless denial—all of which Carlyle fought assiduously his entire life, is alone (as the "No" in finite reflection), responsible for the shameful failures, horrendous crimes, meaningless futilities, and despicable remainders strewn about the bloody field of human struggle. Carlyle believed this, too, as his literary works also demonstrate. He was "churchless" to pedestrian eyes but in him this was by no means indicative of faithlessness; quite the contrary.

Eventually, it will be accepted that the Idea worked in Carlyle and uttered itself through him as in every other great mind in human history. Some felt and welcomed the Divine Presence and others were unconscious of it and concerned themselves with their work, unaware of the actual foundation of their positive achievements. The Divine worked in them nonetheless, in accordance with their intrinsic and acquired powers. Our study throughout has demonstrated the underlying physical means and the overarching spiritual reasons for Divine Didacticism in Man.

"My yoke is easy and my burden is light," spoke the "greatest of all Heroes" regarding the divine side of all cooperation between Man and his Triune Creator. As for the negative in human history—past, present, and future—it is Man's doing alone. By our reckoning, the orthodoxy of these views requires no defense.

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